Publications

This study investigates perceptions of AI-generated profile pictures and how disclosure of AI use shapes impressions. In a preregistered experiment, U.S. adults (N = 817; ages 18–99, M = 47.83, SD = 18.79; 48% men and 50% women) evaluated what they were told were social media profile pictures. The 2 × 2 factorial design varied whether images, all with a professional headshot style, were AI-generated and whether they were disclosed as AI-generated. Across three outcomes, AI-generated images were rated as higher quality than professional photos of the same subjects, but disclosure that an image was AI-generated reduced perceived quality. On average, AI generation and disclosure did not significantly affect perceptions of the person’s social attractiveness or trustworthiness. Exploratory analyses indicated that self-assessed AI knowledge moderated responses to disclosure: lower-knowledge respondents downgraded labeled images and the depicted person, whereas higher-knowledge respondents evaluated labeled images and the person more positively. Taken together, the findings suggest that disclosure of AI use primarily affects evaluations of the image as an object rather than person-level impressions.

Despite the amount of research on the topic, there are few direct measurements of partisan segregation in media use. Instead, indirect evidence, like coefficients in multiple regression models, is typically used to indicate the presence or (more typically) absence of partisan segregation. The few methods that do approximate a direct measure require dichotomizing partisanship of people and sources, which is problematic in the United States and unworkable in many other democracies. I suggest using a method originally designed to measure residential segregation to quantify the amount of balkanization in media use at the country, party, and individual levels. To show the potential of the measure, I use data from a nationally representative survey to describe the amount of partisan segregation in media consumption in the United States.

Measuring communication is among the most difficult and consequential issues in the discipline. Even the most promising methods tend to have serious drawbacks in terms of feasibility, accuracy, or scope. This study develops two brief questionnaire measures to assess the frequency and partisan orientation of political media exposure and discussion. Addressing the challenge of accurate self-reporting in survey research, especially under time constraints, cognitive interviews were conducted to refine the measures. Initial quantitative validity evidence suggests moderate correlations with related constructs, indicating the measures’ potential utility in capturing meaningful variation in political communication behaviors.

jtools is an R package designed to ease the exploration and presentation of regression models with a focus on the needs of social scientists. Most notably, it generates results summaries that are meant to provide some of the conveniences of commercial software such as Stata (e.g., calculating robust standard errors and integrating them into a results table). Additionally, jtools includes plotting functions to help users better understand and share the results and predictions from fitted regression models.

Since the earliest days of communication research, key findings have often involved the claim that attitudes or behaviors become stable because of communication. Research tends to focus on changes in attitudes or behaviors, however, which can cause confusion when changes are not observed. A lack of theorizing about stability leaves scientists unable to distinguish between null results and attitude stabilization that occurs because of communication. Furthermore, research tends to use the term reinforcement in a way that sometimes means stability, but in others means attitude change. This article argues that stability can be an effect of communication and provides an overview of the research designs needed to perform research of this kind. It concludes by showing how an existing theory, the reinforcing spirals model, can be used to make predictions about how communication leads to stability.

Much effort has been devoted into understanding the participatory outcomes of political satire. Despite the increased impact of social media in disseminating political information online, however, researchers have not yet examined the potential role of social media in the relationship between political satire consumption and political communication processes. This study uses a three-wave panel survey to test the effects of both viewing political satire (intentionally) and incidental exposure (via shared content on social media) to political satire on political discussion, mediated by the viewers’ conversation about the content of political satire. This study also examines how Affinity for Political Humor (AFPH), specifically its social cohesion dimension, moderates those relationships. Results demonstrate that regardless of whether the exposure was incidental via social media or not, exposure to political satire increased political discussion, mediated by conversation about political satire. This indirect effect differed by individuals’ level of AFPH. These results indicate that viewing political satire, even when it is incidental, can make people more likely to talk about the content of the satire programs, which in turn can promote their political discussion in general. This effect was found to be more prominent among those who score high on AFPH.

Since race is a central factor in politics in the U.S – being correlated with political perceptions and viewpoints – and talk across racial boundaries is uncommon, the study of political talk across racial lines requires considerably more attention in the political communication literature on exposure to political difference. This study seeks to contrast availability with preference mechanisms in having cross-race political discussion partners. We employ a diverse sample of U.S. adults with a Black oversample. We compare having a cross-race discussion partner in the existing network with willingness and preference for a cross-race discussant in a purported political discussion as part of a study. We find Blacks actually have more cross-race political discussants than Whites in reality, but Whites express a greater willingness and preference for having cross-race political discussants. These findings are situated within the political communication, sociology, and social psychology literatures, and are extended to other national contexts.

Anti-intellectualism (resentment, hostility, and mistrust of experts) has become a growing concern that influences public understanding of science during the pandemic. Using topic modeling and supervised machine learning, this study examines the elements and sources of anti-Fauci tweets as a case of anti-intellectual discourse on social media. Based on the theoretical framework of science-related populism, we identified three anti-intellectual discursive elements in anti-Fauci tweets: people-scientist antagonism, delegitimizing the motivation of scientists, and delegitimizing the knowledge of scientists. Delegitimizing the motivation of scientists appeared most frequently in anti-Fauci tweets. Politicians, conservative news media, and non-institutionalized masses co-constructed the production and circulation of anti-intellectual discourses on Twitter. Anti-intellectual discourses resurged even under Twitter’s content moderation mechanism. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for building public trust in scientists, effective science communication, and content moderation policies on social media.

This paper discusses the assessment of quality of quantitative communication research in light of the so-called ‘replicability crisis’ that has affected neighboring disciplines. For social scientific research, it is useful to think of research results as estimates which include error. I propose a framework suited to a variable field like communication, factoring in all sources of error, for assessing the quality of research. In communication research, greater consideration of generalizability is essential, which is at once both a higher standard than replicability but also a goal that should increase it. Furthermore, more explicit discussion of generalizability may help to further internationalize the discipline by clarifying the limitations of the large portion of research conducted within a narrow subset of world cultures.

Despite a great deal of research, much about the effects of political comedy programming on its viewers remains uncertain. One promising line of work has focused on increased internal political efficacy — the sense that one is competent to engage with politics — as an outcome of exposure to political comedy programs. This may explain results showing that viewers are more likely to participate in politics. We extend this approach by considering the role of political comedy’s “gateway” effect in encouraging political media consumption, which can promote additional increases in efficacy and participation. This study provides a theoretical synthesis of prior research and a rigorous empirical test using a representative panel survey of adults in the United States, providing evidence of a relationship between political comedy and participation with both news use and internal efficacy serving as mediators. Furthermore, we find that only political satire, not late-night talk shows, appear to produce these effects.

This study integrates and builds upon research on moral psychology, entertainment media selection, and political communication that has established a link between political ideology and moral sentiments. An automated content analysis of the lyrics of 37,309 songs across 10 genres assessed the extent of appeals to five different moral domains defined by Moral Foundations Theory. The results of the content analysis are integrated with nationally-representative survey data (N = 1000) by linking lyrical content with self-reported preference for and exposure to musical genres. We then correlate the content of preferred genres with self-reported moral sentiments and political ideology. We find the moral content of music lyrics in the genres used by respondents is associated with their moral preferences and political ideology.

This article provides evidence that affective polarization is an important mechanism linking conservative media use to political misperceptions. Partisan media’s potential to polarize is well documented, and there are numerous ways in which hostility toward political opponents might promote the endorsement of inaccurate beliefs. We test this mediated model using data collected via nationally representative surveys conducted during two recent U.S. presidential elections. Fixed effects regression models using three-wave panel data collected in 2012 provide evidence that conservative media exposure contributes to more polarized feelings toward major-party presidential candidates, and this growing favorability gap is associated with misperceptions critical of the Democrats. Further, these effects are more pronounced among Republicans than among Democrats. Cross-sectional analyses using data collected in 2016 provide additional evidence of the mediated relationship. The theoretical and real-world significance of these results are discussed.

There is growing concern about the polarizing impact of citizens primarily choosing sources of political information consistent with their existing partisan perspective. While research has begun providing answers about the consequences, questions remain about what factors drive such selective use of political media. This study conceptualizes partisanship as a social identity and the decision to selectively use likeminded political media as a method for maintenance of that identity. Using the logic of the Reinforcing Spirals Model (Slater, 2007, 2015), we investigated partisan media selectivity as a response to identity threat. We argue the partisan composition of one’s geographic locale and the presence of partisan difference in one’s interpersonal network are common causes of identity threat, which we predict will be associated with compensatory use of partisan media. Results from national survey data generally provide support for the assertion that greater partisan media selectivity is associated with the presence of various forms of identity threat, especially for strong partisans.